The Potential Impact of Labor Choices on the Efficacy of Marine Conservation Strategies by Hughes, Zachary D. et al.
The Potential Impact of Labor Choices on the Efficacy of
Marine Conservation Strategies
Zachary D. Hughes
1*, Eli P. Fenichel
2, Leah R. Gerber
2
1School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, United States of America, 2School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, United
States of America
Abstract
Conservation of marine resources is critical to the wellbeing of human communities. Coastal artisanal fishing communities
are particularly reliant on marine resources for food and for their livelihoods. Management actions aimed at marine
conservation may lead to unanticipated changes in human behavior that influence the ability of conservation programs to
achieve their goals. We examine how marine conservation strategies may impact labor decisions that influence both the
ecosystem and human livelihoods using simulation modeling. We consider two conservation strategies in the model: direct
action through fisheries regulation enforcement, and indirect action through land conservation. Our results indicate that
both strategies can increase the abundance of fish, and thus contribute to the maintenance of marine resources. However,
our results also show that marine fisheries enforcement may negatively impact the livelihoods of human communities. Land
conservation, on the other hand, potentially enhances the livelihood of the human populations. Thus, depending on
management objectives, indirect or a combination of direct and indirect conservation strategies may be effective at
achieving conservation and sustainability goals. These results highlight the importance of accounting for changes in human
behavior resulting from management actions in conservation and management.
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Introduction
Marine conservation and fisheries management strategies
generally aim to maintain species diversity or enhance fisheries
[1]. However, conserving fish stocks is not synonymous with
sustaining or enhancing the wellbeing of people dependent on those
fisheries. Indeed, the best unconstrained way to preserve fish stocks
is not to fish[2]. Conservation implies ‘‘wise use’’ [3], therefore,
marine conservation approaches and sustainable fisheries must
consider the benefits to people [4,5]. Thus, the conservation of fish
stocks is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a sustainable
fishery. As such, there are more policies that can lead to the
conservation of a fish stock or its enhancement than lead to long
term fisheries sustainability. Strategies that best enhance or
maintain fish stocks may not satisfy all the necessary conditions
for fishery sustainability. Fishery sustainability may be particularly
important in developing communities with coastal artisanal fisheries
that are reliant on fishery resources for livelihoods and subsistence.
Marine conservation strategies often focus on establishing and
enforcing regulations to curb overfishing resulting from open-
access fisheries [4]. However, making marine management
decisions based solely on biology, without considering how fishing
incentives change behavior, may undermine ecological, social, and
economic goals [4–7]. Furthermore, it is important to examine
how costs and benefits associated with conservation actions are
distributed throughout the community. Including social and
economic factors in marine conservation decision-making is
critical to maintaining a flow of ecosystem services [8–10] and
preserving livelihoods for the people most impacted by marine
conservation actions [11]. Research has shown that when
conservation measures preserve critical services or benefit
alternative livelihood options such as tourism, they may net
positive socio-economic and development benefits [12].
Management recommendations based on consideration of
socio-economic feedbacks often differ from recommendations that
only consider ecological or economic components of the system
[13]. Rondeau and Bulte [14] demonstrated that wildlife
conservation efforts can have perverse impacts on wildlife
populations and human welfare if conservation programs fail to
account for how changes in the management or the ecosystem
alter human behavioral incentives. Leslie et al. [15] modeled how
different economic sectors can respond differently to ecological
perturbations influencing the stability of ecological processes.
Finnoff and Tschirhart [16] demonstrated the connection between
ecological conditions and market prices and showed how these
interactions influence human behaviors that impact the marine
environment. We contribute to this literature of linked socio-
ecological systems by modeling how marine conservation strategies
may affect labor decisions that influence fish stocks.
Marine conservation efforts in developing regions are often
organized by international NGOs or governmental agencies with
simultaneous goals of enhancing human livelihoods through socio-
economic development and engaging in conservation – the
protection of wild populations [1]. Accordingly, we model third
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with an eye towards the development impacts. Two conservation
strategies are considered: coastal land conservation (indirect
marine conservation) and improving the enforcement of fisheries
regulations (direct marine conservation). These conservation
strategies work to preserve fish stocks by incentivizing changes in
human behavior that heavily influence fish stocks. Land
conservation may indirectly affect labor choices by creating
incentives for tourism producers to increase employment in the
tourism industry. Land conservation also influences marine life
indirectly by reducing pollution from terrestrial areas into the
marine environment. Pollution can increase mortality and reduce
recruitment for marine wildlife [17,18]. The enforcement of
fishery regulations acts directly to limit fishing effort by creating
disincentives to fishing. Enforcement of common fisheries
regulations (e.g., spatial and temporal closures and gear restric-
tions) increases expected costs to local fishers [19,20] all else equal,
and reduces fishing effort. In both cases, the policies affect the fish
stock through providing incentives in fishing behavior.
We apply a general equilibrium framework to model a real
world system, linking economic sectors with the local ecology to
explore how the system may operate under alternative conserva-
tion options. Our work is novel in that it integrates conservation
management, condition of the fish stock, labor allocation
decisions, and wage rates. We examine how incentive structures
alter human behavior in efforts to conserve marine resources. We
also highlight the importance of examining ecological and socio-
economic linkages in order to determine how costs and benefits act
on artisanal fishing communities.
We consider two economic sectors: fishing and tourism. The
profits available from fishing relative to the wages available from
working in tourism provide the economic incentives that motivate
fishing effort. Income (i.e., wage rate) is used as the measure of local
economic wellbeing in the model. We use our model to analyze the
indirect effects that marine conservation has on the local economy,
how changes in the local economy affect marine conservation, and
whether conservation costs are internalized by the community,
externalized through the resources, or shifted to other (potentially
more developed) economic trading partners (e.g., tourists). This
allows us to examine how the costs and benefits for marine
conservation actions are distributed in order to determine whether
the local community gains or losses from conservation actions.
System background: Loreto Bay, Baja California Sur,
Mexico
Loreto’s primary economic sectors include artisanal fishing and
tourism [21]. Eighty percent of employment in Loreto is in the
tourism and fishing, and marine resources are important to Loreto’s
economy through both the fishery and tourism [21]. We model the
fishery resource using leopard grouper life history characteristics
and population estimates to represent the state of fishery resources.
The leopard grouper (Mycteroperca rosacea) is highly targeted in
artisanal fishing [22], may increase tourism demand through
enhanced diving experiences [23], and plays an important role in
maintaining marine ecosystem structure [24]. Ecosystem manage-
ment approaches are highly desirable in fisheries [25], but are still
only emerging. Most fisheries management is still single stock
management; therefore, in an effort to focus on the positive
influenceofalternative policies,wefocusonasingle dominantstock.
Methods
We first develop a conceptual model (Fig. 1) to gain intuition
about the relative effects of direct and indirect conservation actions
on the local economy and labor choices. Fisheries enforcement
changes how a representative individual allocates his labor,
thereby altering harvest levels and impacts on the fish stock. Land
conservation alters the employers’ allocation of resources between
labor and land, indirectly impacting harvest and fish stock. Our
model describes feedbacks between the local economy and the
availability of biomass available to fisheries. We then parameterize
our model and simulate feedbacks over a 25 year period
(Appendix S1, Table S1). We parameterize the model with data
on income, harvest, employment in Loreto and biological data on
the fish stocks targeted by Loreto fishers (Appendix S1, Table S2.).
We establish a baseline equilibrium and then perturb the model by
implementing regulatory changes to explore the impacts of our
respective policy choice. This allows us to examine the dynamic
feedbacks between marine wildlife and the human communities in
Loreto. Our primary focus is on new ecological-economic
equilibrium generated by the policy change and the implications
for conservation and development.
Model Development
We assume that land and labor are required to produce tourism,
and tourism producers choose between these inputs in order to
minimize production costs. Furthermore, we assume that land and
labor are substitutable. For instance, the overall experience of a
tourist may be improved by having more individual space,
personal service, or by having more infrastructure. The substitut-
ability may not always be direct, but producers can offer a variety
of services to shift between land and labor. Fishing is always an
employment option, even when there are no tourism employment
opportunities; therefore, we assume full employment.
We assume that fishing has no fixed costs (i.e., boats and gear
can be rented, owners of fishing gear forgo opportunity of renting
out their gear to others, and there are no mooring or licensing
costs in Loreto). Fishermen receive a constant market price for fish
that is set by the global markets that fishers can access. Increases in
tourism may effectively alter which markets that fisher’s access
(we’d like to thank Heather Leslie for pointing this out). Increases
in tourism market may shift fish demand and increase the price of
fish in two ways. First, increased tourism adds consumers, which
may increase the extent of the local fresh fish market that fisher’s
may access. Second, the properties of the representative consumer
in the local fresh fish market may change, potentially leading to
greater demand and higher prices for fish. Nevertheless, the
volume of local catch has no effect on the price of fish. We
consider the potential effect of tourism development on fish prices
in the sensitivity analysis. Marine protected areas and gear
restrictions are examples of fisheries regulations that increase the
costs of fishing effort, and these are types of regulations considered
for Loreto Bay [23]. In our model, fisheries regulation increases
the marginal costs of fishing effort, but the regulations do not affect
the revenue from fish caught. Therefore, our model represents
regulations such as area closures or gear restrictions such as those
recently implemented in Loreto. The increased costs may be
conceptualized as increased transit times, fuel costs, and loss of
preferred fishing grounds (such costs would be associated with a
marine reserve). We assume that there are no barriers to changing
occupations, but relax this assumption in our sensitivity analysis.
We also assume that there is no immigration or emigration of
workers in the model. We performed sensitivity analyses by
adjusting parameters individually to examine the impact of these
assumptions on the qualitative nature of our results.
We model land use such that land use regulation increases the
rental price of land. This simplification neglects many of the issues
associated with land management and land use, such as
Labor Choices and Marine Conservation Strategies
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Inclusion of these issues may alter numerical results, however, they
are unlikely alter the qualitative results.
In our model, the people purchasing units of tourism come
from elsewhere, and the demand for tourism in Loreto exists in a
global tourism market. Tourism demand does not depend on the
disposable income of the local community. We assume a
competitive tourism market in Loreto of several small producers,
and accordingly model productivity. Tourists can be thought of a
resource for the community of the Loreto, but consumer surplus,
a measure of the net benefits to tourists from visiting Loreto, does
not directly influence the wellbeing, development, and sustain-
ability of Loreto. Furthermore, we assume that the owners of
tourism producing capital are not part of the general Loreto
community. Rents to land and other capital are sent out of
Loreto (e.g., through bank loans). Therefore, producer surplus is
not available to the citizens of Loreto. People living in Loreto
only gain from tourism through wages paid for laboring in the
tourism industry, which may be thought of as rent to labor. We
test the assumptions about producer and consumer surplus to
evaluate their impact on model results. Finally, assume that
markets for tourism and labor always clear: producers always fill
the full demand for tourism, and are always able to hire the cost-
minimizing number workers. At each point in time, resource
allocation decisions between land and labor by tourism operators
are made based on the current state of the world. Tourism
producers and workers do not engage in forward looking
behavior, instead seek to minimize production costs or maximize
income over the short term instead of seeking the optimum
allocation of resources to maximize the present value of all future
income.
Model of the local labor market
Artisanal fisheries are often characterized by open access, where
entry into the fishery is not limited or controlled [26]: or regulated
open access management regimes where fishers to do not have
secure property rights but are subject to some regulations such as
gear restrictions or seasonal or area closures [27]. In both cases the
resource is a common pool good. Open access and regulated open
access generally imply that economic rents from fishing are
dissipated and economic profits are driven to zero [27,28]. The
reason for this is that as stocks improve, additional effort enters the
fishery to exploit these stocks and the system reaches a new
equilibrium with zero profits [4,27–29]. Homans and Wilen [27]
show that even if regulations that meet biological objectives and
increase yields, fisheries can still suffer from dissipation of profits if
entry is not limited. The economic problem is that yield goals are
met, but fishers employ excess effort, fail to operate at least cost,
and drive profits to zero [4,27,30]. For profits to exists, the same
catch would need to be achieved by fewer fishers operating at
lower cost (limited entry). In our model, profits from fishing are
driven to zero, but only after considering the opportunity cost of
forgoing working in tourism. The opportunity costs of tourism
employment prevents fishing profits from reaching zero.
In our model, workers seek to maximize net income, and we
consider a representative net income maximizing individual, who
divides labor between the fishing and tourism sectors. Total net
income for workers is the sum of net income from fishing and net
income from working in tourism. Income from working in tourism
is equal to the wage rate, times labor allocated to tourism. The
wage rate reflects labor market competition with fishing and is
endogenously determined. In a competitive labor market, the
tourism wage rate is equal to the marginal profit from fishing.
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the simulation model of primary interactions between model components. Conservation options act
on the system by increasing the land rental price or increasing the cost of fishing. Pollution is driven by land use and impacts the fish stock through
recruitment and mortality. Fish stock is also impacted by fishing effort through harvest. Wage rate is affected by fish stock and cost of fishing.
Demand for tourism is influenced by the fish stock, while the demand, wage rate, and land rental price determine the allocation of land and tourism
labor. (1) Shows where fisheries enforcement interacts with the model by increasing the cost of fishing and decreasing the profit from fishing.
(2) Land conservation interacts with the model by increasing the land rental price and decreasing the amount of land used. (3) Fish stock affects the
quantity of tourism demanded by increasing or decreasing the amount people are willing to pay for a unit of tourism. (4) Fishing effort alters fish
mortality and controls the size of the fish stock.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g001
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functions of fishing regulation enforcement and the fish stock.
In a competitive labor market the tourism wage rate and
income from fishing equalize at each point in time, and this
enables the wage rate to serve as the indicator of community
wellbeing. At any instant, the representative worker takes the fish
stock and enforcement as given. Though in an optimally managed
fishery a larger fish stock implies greater future profits from fishing,
an individual worker has no incentive to conserve the fish stock
because he does not have secured rights to the stock and has no
guarantee of benefiting from conservation [28,31].
The harvest component of this model is the common Schaefer
(catch-per-unit effort) harvest function [28]. This implies that the
size of the fish stock effects revenue from fishing. The profitability
of fishing is related to the market price of fish. There are two cost
components in the fishing profit function. Both are independent of
the fish stock. The first is the constant marginal cost of a unit of
fishing effort, such as fuel, and boat rental (or the opportunity cost
of not renting one’s boat to another person). The second
represents the marginal costs to the fishermen associated with
fisheries regulations enforcement. It is desirable that the level of
regulation is a function of the fish stock [32]. However, area
closures and gear restrictions such as the regulations used in
Loreto are unlikely to adapt to changes in the fish stocks, so we
considered policies that are set irrespective of the fish stock.
Tourism production
Assume that tourism employers operate in a competitive market
and face a downward sloping demand function (i.e., as tourism
price fails the demand level increases). The supply of tourism
services is a function of tourism labor and land. We assume
decreasing marginal returns to increases in either labor or land for
the production of tourism services. Tourism operators are price
takers for wages and land rental. We adopt the Cobb-Douglas
production function as an approximation that satisfies our
assumptions about the nature of tourism production, with
technology parameters represent diminishing returns to scale
consistent with several small producers of tourism operating in a
competitive market.
Tourism producers minimize costs while meeting demand.
Tourism producers take the wage rate as given due to competition
with the fishing sector for labor, but choose the quantity of workers
to employ. The tourism wage rate is the minimum wage that
tourism operators must offer in order to make workers indifferent
between fishing and working in tourism, and is equal to the
marginal profit from fishing for an extra unit of time. Tourism
requires space for infrastructure to operate. The area available for
development is a factor in determining the cost of operating a
tourism business. The land rental price is a function of land
conservation. When land is conserved, the available land reduces
and the land rental price increases. If land is neither conserved nor
actively used for tourism, then residual land decreases the price of
land rental (land is less scarce).
Dynamic simulation methods
We use the STELLA [33] modeling environment to simulate a
25 year time horizon for three conservation scenarios: no change
in conservation effort, increasing the marginal cost associated with
fishing (e.g., increasing fisheries regulations), and increasing the
land rental price through land conservation. Model equations are
provided in Table S3. The local economy model simulates the
production of tourism, allocation of workers, and the wage rate as
a function of the fish stock. The dynamics come from the link
between the local economy and the fish stock. The fish stock
changes over time as a function of recruitment and harvest, which
is a function of fishing effort and is determined by local economic
conditions and biological parameters. In our simulation model, the
local economy is linked to the fish stock component through the
fish stock level, fishing effort, tourism demand, and pollution
(Figure 1). We compare the impact of each scenario on livelihoods
for workers living in Loreto and the leopard grouper stock
The fish stock is modeled using a stage structured model with
two stages, juveniles and adults. A Ricker stock-recruitment
function is used to determine the annual juvenile leopard grouper
recruitment per adult (see Appendix S1), with recruitment from
the juvenile stage to adult occurring at age four [34]. In the model,
conservation strategies lead to changes in the marginal cost of
fishing (fisheries enforcement) or the land rental price (land
conservation). In the simulation model, we evaluate fisheries
enforcement and land conservation strategies modeled by
increasing the marginal cost of fishing or the land rental price
by 0 to 50%. The model simulates the decentralized competitive
allocation of land and labor. The supply of tourism is determined
by the costs to produce tourism and yields the market clearing
quantity of tourism, the point at which the tourism supplied is
equal to the tourism demanded.
We consider changes to assumptions about barriers to changing
occupations and capital ownerships. We investigate the effect of
including costs for transitioning between occupations to test our
assumption of no barriers to changing occupations because
artisanal fishers are frequently the lowest income group in their
communities, and fishing is generally considered the income of last
resort [35]. Local ownership of capital can be important in
development. Our base model assumes no local ownership of
capital. We test this assumption by incorporating changes
producer and consumer surplus into the welfare calculations to
test the assumptions.
The simulation model is used to compare the three manage-
ment strategies, the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about
model structure, and the sensitivity of results to parameter values.
First, we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to the
parameters, by increasing each parameter independently, over
all three management scenarios. Second, we compare tourism
demand that is not conditional on the state of the ecosystem with a
tourism demand that shifts upward by a marine ecosystem with
increased leopard grouper abundance. The upward shift in
demand is motivated by Wielgus et al.’s [23] estimate of an
increased willingness to pay for the chance to see more fish during
tourism related diving. We calculate the change in likelihood to see
grouper in the Loreto area based on Wielgus et al. [23], and then
multiply this change in likelihood by the willingness to pay to see
the fish [23] (also Table S2). However, this willingness to pay is an
overestimation because it does not account for diminishing returns
associated with viewing more wildlife [36]. In the model, the
willingness to pay to see greater numbers of fish increases the
choke price (the price consumers are willing to pay as available
quantity of tourism goes to zero) of the demand curve thereby
increasing quantity of tourism demanded at a given price.
Third, we consider how changes in the tourism demand may
affect fish prices and how this may impact the results of the model.
Local catch generally does not affect the price of fish; fishermen
are price takers competing in a market and cannot exert control
over prices. We assume that demand is derived from a mix of local
and global markets. However, tourism may shift demand in the
local fresh market. We consider the potential for increases in
tourism to shift the demand curve for fish up (i.e., increase the
choke price).
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local community when the fish stock is initially stable and in cases
when it is declining. The decline in the fish stock is modeled as
resulting from increasing the catchability coefficient, representing
an increase in fishing ability (e.g., increases in fishing technology
over time).
Finally, we consider the potential effects of pollution on the size
of the fish stock in order to test the potential benefit to the marine
environment from pollution prevention associated with the land
conservation option. Pollution is modeled at various rates as
proportional to the amount of land used in the production of
tourism, and pollution is assumed to reduce recruitment and
increase adult fish mortality.
Results
We first examine the effects of alternative conservation
strategies by exploring results derived from the labor allocation
model in order to gain intuition about the system (Table 1). We
then analyze simulation results from the model calibrated to
Loreto for the three conservation scenarios. Parameters and data
sources for the model are provided in Tables S1 and S2.
Summary of Generalized Model
Assuming a fixed labor supply, an increase in tourism labor
implies a decrease in fishing effort. Therefore, both marine
conservation strategies have the potential to reduce fishing effort,
but through different means. Protecting land causes tourism
operators to substitute labor for land; this requires a higher wage
rate. A higher wage rate requires a greater return to fishing. If the
return to fishing is lower, then individuals would opt to seek
employment in tourism. However, the higher cost of tourism
causes the quantity of tourism demanded to retract. Tourism
operators require fewer workers so workers are ‘‘pushed’’ back to
fishing. The net effect on the allocation of labor and wage rate is
ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of tourism demand with
respect to the price of tourism.
An external increase in fishing regulation or enforcement of
regulations lowers the income for all workers throughout the
economy by lowering the marginal profit of fishing. These results
apply over the long term because the modeled regulations (marine
protected areas, gear restrictions, etc.) result in regulated open
access, and new fishers continue to have incentive enter and to
compete away profits [27]. This pushes down wages since tourism
operators can then substitute cheaper labor for land. Furthermore,
the cheaper labor may lower the market clearing price of tourism
and cause an increase in the quantity of tourism supplied. Changes
in environmental quality may shift tourism demand, and changes
in tourism may alter fish prices. A reduction in land use may have
further conservation benefits if it reduces land-based marine
pollution. Fisheries enforcement unambiguously reduces fishing
effort, but the effects on wages are generally ambiguous and
depend on specific relationships in the system.
Both conservation strategies have the potential to reduce fishing
effort and increase fish stocks, but the cost of conservation is borne
by different parties. In standard welfare analysis, attention is given
to consumer and producer surplus [37]. However, in the coastal
communities of many developing countries, consumer and
producer surplus are exported out of the system and do not
accrue to the local community. The wages paid to the local
community, however, are part of what is usually not considered –
wages are considered transfer payments. Figure 2 illustrates how
benefits are shifted with conservation action. Supply1 represents
the initial state of the system with no conservation action, and
Supply2 represents the new supply curve when land conservation is
implemented.
With land conservation, consumer surplus is shifted from
polygon that is the sum of areas A, B, D, and G to A (Figure 2).
The producer surplus changes from the polygon that is the sum of
areas C, E, and H to the sum of B and C. The wages paid to the
workers are initially some portion of the polygon that is the sum of
areas F and I, but with land conservation wages paid to the
workers are a portion of polygon D, E, F. The proportion of the
polygon that is wages also changes. This indicates that with land
conservation some of the costs of implementing conservation may
be exported to those outside of the system and benefits transferred
to local workers. Enforcement of fisheries regulations has the
opposite effect and rotates the tourism supply curve down. In the
case of fisheries enforcement, local workers bear the costs of
conservation. Artisanal fishermen are price takers and cannot
transfer the cost of conservation to consumers (this is true whether
tourism affects the price of fish or not). This is a result of the elastic
demand for locally caught fish. Conversely, land conversation
divides conservation costs among tourism consumers (due to the
downward sloping demand), tourism producers, and tourism
workers (Figure 2).
Including producer or consumer surplus, or both together, does
not change the qualitative results of the model. The model shows
that fisheries enforcement increases consumer (tourist) surplus,
while reducing producer surplus and wages (Table S4.). Land
conservation decreases consumer surplus and increases producer
surplus and wages (Table S4.). Thus the model demonstrates an
increase in community welfare from wages and producer surplus
with land conservation, and a decrease in overall community
welfare as benefits are shifted to tourists with fisheries regulation
enforcement. However, increasing local ownership of capital
assets, which increases the amount of producer surplus that says in
community, likely also enhances development, but is beyond the
scope of this article.
Simulation results
We examine results by comparing the equilibrium state prior to
the implementation of conservation actions the equilibrium or
near equilibrium state at the end of the simulation (T=10 and 35
respectively). Simulation shows that both conservation strategies
lead to an increase in the fish stock compared to cases with no
additional conservation action (Figure 3). However, only land
conservation potentially meets the socio-economic objective of
enhancing livelihoods for the local population (Figure 4). Fisheries
enforcement leads to a decrease in livelihoods in all scenarios. As
the fish stock increases from fisheries enforcement, the wage rate
begins to recover, but never returns to the level of income before
regulations are enforced (Figure 4). Calculating the present value
of all future income shows that fisheries enforcement leads to a
Table 1. Results from analytic model.
Increased Variable Fish Stock Wage Rate Fishing Effort
Fisheries Enforcement+ --
Land Conservation Ambiguous + Ambiguous
Wage Rate + N/A -
Fish Stock N/A ++
Pluses indicate an increase in the stock or parameter from the column header
with an increase stock or parameter in the row header, while minuses indicate a
decrease.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.t001
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land conservation shows at 6.5–7.0% increase (Table 2). This
shows that enforcement of fishing regulations may be the most
effective way to directly conserve the fish stock, but that
regulations that increase the cost of fishing likely have a negative
impact on the overall livelihoods for coastal artisanal fishing
communities.
Sensitivity analyses indicate that small changes in the param-
eters do not change the qualitative results of the model (Table S5.).
The model is most sensitive to the technology parameters
associated with the relative productivity of land and labor, b and
c. This indicates that the model is sensitive to the assumption of
degree of substitutability between land and labor. More generally,
it indicates that ecological outcomes may be strongly influenced by
economic factors that influence how people interact with the
economic-ecological system in order to generate their livelihoods.
Including fish population as a tourism demand shifter had no
qualitative effect on the simulation results. This is due to the
Figure 2. Benefit shift of conservation actions. Figure 2 illustrates how benefits are shifted with conservation action. Supply1 represents the
initial state of our system with no conservation action, and Supply2 represents the new supply curve when land conservation is implemented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g002
Figure 3. Impacts of the various marine conservation strategies on fish stocks. Conservation strategies are implemented at year 10,
denoted by the vertical line. Both conservation strategies lead to an increase in fish stock in this scenario.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g003
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we would expect an increase in fish stocks to increase the demand
for tourism. If this demand effect were sufficiently large, then it is
possible that the demand increase could mitigate the wage effects
from fisheries enforcement, making this a more attractive
conservation option. More data on the marginal effect of increase
in fish stock on tourism demand is needed to analyze the potential
for such effects, but other research (e.g., [13]) suggests that
environmental quality improvements have rapidly declining
marginal value for tourists.
Increases in tourism demand potentially increase the price of
fish. We tested several levels of tourism influence on fish prices,
from no effect on the price, to the price of fish being entirely
dependent on tourism. The qualitative results for the model
remained unchanged, but the extent of effects were impacted.
Local market impacts on fish price due to tourism create a tighter
coupling between the two economic sectors. When tourism
increases the demand, and hence market clearing price for fish,
then enforcing fishery regulations results in less stock conservation
(as a result of higher extract value), but also enables greater wage
preservation as compared to a market with a globally determined
price of fish. Wages are preserved because effectively fishermen are
contributing indirectly to the tourism economy. The effects reverse
for land conservation. When fish price is a function of tourism and
the land conservation strategy is employed, then increases in land
conservation yield greater stock conservation but lower wages
relative to the baseline case of global market determine fish prices.
If fish stocks decline over time as a result of increasing
catchability (e.g. associated with exogenous technology or
knowledge improvement), then only fisheries enforcement miti-
gates fish stock declines (Figure 5). Land conservation had no
observable effect on the fish stock. Land conservation, however,
still leads to an increase in the wage rate for the local people while
fisheries enforcement lead to a decrease in the wage rate (Figure 6).
Pollution affects the model system in two ways. Higher levels of
pollution lead to fish stock declines that cause wages to decline.
When the size of fish stock is a factor in the demand for tourism,
pollution indirectly lowers the demand for tourism, but does not
alter the qualitative results. However, when pollution is decreased
from land conservation, fish stock increases are limited by expanded
fishing effort in response to increased profitability. Carpenter and
Brock [38 indicated that an increase in fish stock might lead to
increased levels of fishing; this implies that local residents may
attempt to capture ecosystem service benefits generated by a cleaner
Figure 4. Impacts of the various marine conservation strategies on the yearly wage rate. Conservation strategies are implemented at year
10, denoted by the vertical line. Land conservation leads to an increase in the wage rate, while fisheries enforcement decreases the wage rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g004
Table 2. Present value of all future income for an individual worker with the different conservation actions.
Discount Rate No Conservation Fisheries Enforcement Land Conservation
1% $84,661 $82,193 $87,765
2.5% $71,147 $69,215 $73,785
5% $54,613 $53,230 $56,679
10% $35,129 $34,139 $36,519
Results are tested over various discount rates. Fisheries enforcement leads to a decrease in the present value of all future wages of 2.5% to 3%, while land conservation
leads to an increase in the present value of future wages of 6.5% to 7%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.t002
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access nature of the fishery. Moreover, there are not obvious
benefits to the fish stock because of expanded fishing effort. This
implies that under a regulated open access regime, there are limited
benefits from mitigating pollution. Knowler [39] observes similar
disincentives for the case of controlling invasive species in open
access fisheries. The increased fishing effort mitigated gains to the
fish stock when using the land conservation strategy with pollution
effects included. However, wage rate was greater than when
conservation actions were not implemented.
Modeling the inclusion of barriers to changing occupations, in the
form of a cost for transitioning between working in tourism and
Figure 5. Marine conservation strategies on fish stock when the stock is declining. Fish stock is modeled as declining due to an increase in
the catchability coefficient, representing improving fishing technology, with conservation strategies being implemented at 10 years, denoted by the
vertical line. Fisheries enforcement slows the loss of fish stock, while land conservation has ambiguous effects on the fish stock.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g005
Figure 6. Wage rate with declining fish stock. Conservation strategies are implemented at year 10, denoted by the vertical line. Fisheries
enforcement leads to a decline in the present value of all future income for workers, and also creates instability in wage rates. Land conservation
leads to an increase in the wage rate. The initial instability in the model is due to the implementation of increased ability to catch fish. Due to the
recruitment delay of our fish stock, it takes several years for these dynamics to stabilize.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023722.g006
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Including transition costs influences the transient dynamics and leads
to increased oscillations as the system moves towards equilibrium
(Figure S1). The results are qualitatively similar to including open
access model with sluggish entry-exit [28,29], or time lag between
ecological conditions and human response to those changes.
Discussion
Fisheries management regulates incentive structures that
influence human behaviors. In this paper, we illustrate the relative
effects of alternative incentive structures in meeting socio-
economic development and fisheries conservation goals. With
Loreto as a real-world setting, we demonstrate how understanding
how these incentives affect labor allocation decisions may play a
critical role in designing conservation strategies that will be
effective both in conserving marine resources and protecting the
wellbeing and livelihoods of the local population. Our model
provides a general framework for understanding the qualitative
effects of alternative conservation strategies for marine systems.
Furthermore, our approach allows explicit consideration of the
tradeoffs of benefits to the marine environment and the wellbeing
of human communities. Our results highlight the extent to which
incentive structures in the form of conservation actions are
constructed will impact who bears the costs of conservation.
Direct incentives, such as those from fisheries enforcement, may
have the greatest positive impact on marine resources in the short
term, but indirect incentives that work through the market may
meet a wider variety of conservation and human welfare
objectives. Our results indicate that land conservation (indirect
conservation action) could potentially meet a wider variety of
socio-economic development and conservation objectives than
fisheries enforcement (direct conservation action). This may
indicate that land conservation is a better balanced solution for
conservation actions in terms of who bears the costs of
conservation, and how the resultant benefits are distributed.
Who bears the costs of conservation depends on property rights
and ownership of capital. Ownership of capital should be taken
into account when measuring local social wellbeing. When
residents own capital used in the production of tourism, then
capital ownership can be used to indicate how changes in
consumer surplus, producer surplus, or production ‘‘costs’’ may
impact local wellbeing. If locals own tourism capital or land, then
at least a portion of producer surplus goes to the local community.
Land conservation provides incentives for tourism producers to
increase labor use, thereby increasing the demand for labor and
necessarily increasing the wage rate, drawing people away from
fishing as they seek higher income and indirectly enhancing the
fish stock by reducing fishing effort. Under the land conservation
option, income is increased for the local community and enhances
their wellbeing while also working to conserve the marine
environment. The land conservation options shifts the costs of
conservation to others outside of the local system (i.e. tourists). The
clear benefit to fish stocks is lost, however, in the case of
unmitigated decline in the overall fish stock.
As artisanal fishing communities, such as Loreto, work to meet
multiple and sometimes conflicting socio-economic and conserva-
tion objectives, our results shed light on how incentives may be
structured to better meet or measure the tradeoffs of these multiple
objectives. The effects of any conservation action will be filtered
through the incentives that the action generates. Our model
illustrates how conservation actions filter through the system to
affect wage rates and ultimately affect the success of the
conservation action. Further work to identify how local markets
for fish products supported by tourism may extend the results of
our model may increase understanding of how socio-economic
development objectives and conservation objectives can work to
impact the welfare of communities such as Loreto.
Fisheries enforcement imposes costs on the local community
and creates incentives for tourism producers to lower the wage
rate. By creating disincentives for fishing and reducing the
profitability of fishing, people leave fishing to seek alternative
employment, thus directly acting to reduce fishing effort and
enhance fish stocks. However, this surplus of labor allows tourism
producers to lower the wage rate equal to the new profitability of
fishing and reduces the income for the entire community. This also
indicates that land conservation may be a more desirable solution
for meeting socio-economic goals for the local community because
it benefits the community environment and livelihoods, while
exporting some of the costs of doing so.
Our results are consistent with previous research by Allison and
Ellis [6] that demonstrated that fishers’ livelihoods and choices
must be considered in the broader economic environment.
Furthermore, the livelihoods of the entire community are linked
to the abundance of the marine ecosystem. Income from non-
fishing livelihoods is linked to the cost of forgoing the opportunity
to fish. Therefore, when fishing becomes more profitable, the
income from other forms of employment must also rise, and vice-
versa. This may be a particularly useful observation for biological
conservation organizations that want to work in coastal artisanal
fishing communities. In these areas, it may be possible, or even
necessary, to link the development agenda of poverty alleviation
with the conservation agenda of preserving wildlife through
different management strategies that incentivize human behavior
[40]. This is different from the economic impact argument that
supposes when fishing is profitable, the profit is spent in the
community and the effects multiply and create more jobs.
Our model demonstrates that human well-being objectives
associated with economic development and conservation objec-
tives of preserving marine resources may be aligned with due
planning, but that they are not necessarily consistent with one
another. It is important to consider how policies geared towards
sustainability and fisheries conservation create incentives for
certain human behaviors, behaviors that ultimately determine
the success or failure of such policies.
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